Abstract. We study the vulnerability of synthetic as well as real-world networks in center-based attacks. These attacks are node-removal attacks which involve identifying the central node set and removing them from the network.
Introduction
Analysis and prediction of behavioral dynamics of complex systems require a thorough study of their underlying network structures. Real-life networks like biological networks handle massive amount of data. Such big-data networks are becoming larger and complex over time. And so are the tools for modeling and analyzing them. Network science is one of those scientific disciplines which has been emerged by converging the commonalities in many multi-disciplinary research fields. It is a highly specialized as well as an inter-disciplinary subject. One way for studying real networks is by modeling approximate structures. Graph theory enables such a modeling. The well-studied theories and methods in graph theory can aid in mathematical description of large and complex networks. Network analysis has found new directions with the incorporation of graph theoretic concepts in such studies and the advent of complex network theory.
Network security is an all-time relevant research topic. Security threats on complex networks can be either random or targeted. An attacker can either remove or default a functioning node or edge in the network. In targeted attacks the attacker need to identify the potential nodes/edges in the network and destroy them. Based on the type of entity being attacked we can term the attacks as node-targeted or edge-targeted attacks. Analyzing attack vulnerability in synthetic networks (network models) can give insights into how real-world networks behave in such attacks. Such studies are highly recommendable while designing robust and error-tolerant networks. While studying vulnerability, it is always desirable to compare the behaviour of synthetic and real-world networks. Here arise the need of a uniform metric for network vulnerability. Size of the largest connected component (LCC) in the network can be considered as one such metric.
In this paper we focus on the vulnerability of synthetic as well as real-world networks in center-based attacks. Center-based attacks are node-removal attacks which involve identifying the central node set and removing them from the network. Four types of centers are considered here. They are 1. Betweenness center BC 2. Center C 3. Degree center DC and 4. Median M First we present a roadmap of the related works in vulnerability analysis of complex networks (Section 2). Familiarisation of the terminologies associated with this study (Section 3) follows.
The attack strategy is defined in Section 4. In the following section (Section 5) we analyse the robustness of synthetic networks. The network models considered here are:
1. Random Network -Erdős-Rényi (ER) model 2. Small-world Network -Watts-Strogatz model 3. Scale-free Network -Barabási-Albert model
In the next section (Section 6) we analyse the vulnerability of real-world networks. The networks are chosen from different domains areas. They are 1. Collaboration Network -Network Science co-authorship network [31] 2. Literature Network -Les Miserables co-appearance network [24] 3. Airport Network -US popular airports connection network [14] 4. Biological Network -Protein interaction network in Yeast [23] 
Related Works
Research in vulnerability analysis of complex networks has been particularly active during the last decade. Albert et al. in 2000 [1] studied the error and attack tolerance of complex networks. In this work they observe that scale-free networks show an unexpectionally high level of robustness. At almost the same time, Holme et al. (2002) [22] observed that the behavior of real-world networks towards node-attacks was very much different from that of network models. Therefore they suggest that there might be other structural phenomenae which contribute to the behavior of real networks in attacks. Motter and Lai (2002) [27] studied the security threat to complex networks by cascade of failures due to intentional attacks. Their findings underline that many real-world networks which are naturally heterogenous (and survive random attacks) are in fact highly prone to such cascading failures. Later Motter himself proposed a strategy for defending such attacks in heterogenous networks [28] in 2004. Following these findings, Crucitti et al. in their work [13] introduced a model which depicts that attack on a single node is sufficient to destroy the efficiency of the entire network.
Attack vulnerability is also an indication of many structural and dynamic features of networks. Goldshtein et al. [20] , in 2004, studied the hierarchy of complex networks based on its vulnerability meaures. Thus the quantification of vulnerability measures turn out to be of relevance in network analysis. Boccaletti et al., in 2007 , proposed measures to quantify the multiscale evaluation of vulnerability [6] . Mishkovski et. al. [26] , in 2011, proposed a metric for vulnerability measurement. This metric was based on average edge betweenness.
Investigations on the behavior of complex networks towards different types of attacks flourished recently. One notable contribution among them is the noderemoval strategy proposed by Bellingeri et al. (2014) [7] . They observed that the efficiency of strategies depend very much on the network topology. Another closely related contribution is by Nie et al. (2015) [32] in which they proposed two new attack strategies based on both degree and betweenness. They found that these strategies were highly efficient than traditional ones based on degree alone. Attack strategies based on paths were introduced recently. Pu and Cui (2015) [33] proposed attack strategies based on longest paths and observed that homogenous networks are fragile in this category of attacks. Another most recent work in this regard is the shortest path-attacks proposed by Hao et al. (2016) [21] . They found that small world models are highly robust towards such attacks.
Real-world networks are mostly weighted networks. Vulnerability analysis of weighted networks is a new area of research. Bellingeri and Cassi, in their new paper [8] (2017), focus on the change in efficiency of attacks due to weights in the networks. Their work suggest that the vulnerability analysis without considering the weighted structure of networks could be at times misleading.
Terminology

Graph distances and centers
Two vertices u and v in a graph G are said to be adjacent if there is an edge (u, v) joining u and v. The order of G is defined as n = |V | and size of G as m = |E|. Eccentricity Eccentricity of vertex v on G is defined as
is the length of a shortest u − v path in G.
Center A center vertex is a vertex with minimum E G (v). The set of all center vertices is the center set of G and is denoted by C(G) [9] .
where σ st (v) denotes the number of shortest s-t paths passing through v and σ st , the number of shortest s-t paths.
Betweenness Center The betweenness center of a graph G is a vertex with minimum B G (v). The set of all betweenness center vertices is the betweenness center set of G and is denoted by BC(G) [18] .
Median A median vertex is a vertex with minimum D G (v). The set of all median vertices is the median set of G and is denoted by M (G) [9] .
Vertex degree δ(v) is the number of edges incident to the vertex v.
Degree Center of a graph G is a vertex with maximum δ(v). The set of all degree center vertices is the degree center set of G and is denoted by DC(G).
Graph center and median represent global centrality measures of the graph; where as a degree center can be considered as a local centrality measure. Another centrality notion considered in this study is the betweenness center which is related to the geodesics in the graph. To get an insight into the relevance of graph distances in complex networks see [19] and refer [37] for more details on center notions in complex networks.
Network attributes
Degree distribution of G is defined as P (k) = n k n where n k is the number of vertices of degree k in G and n is its size [16] .
Clustering Coefficient of a vertex v in G is the ratio of the number of edges between its neighbors (m v ) to the number of maximum possible edges between them (n v ), i.e. cc(v) = 2mv nv(nv−1) [16] .
Centralities are measures used to evaluate the importance of a node or an edge in a network. Different centrality measures have been identified and investigated upon. The centrality measure analysed in a study depends on the intended application of the network. Most common centrality measures are: -Degree centrality is the degree of a node.
-Closeness centrality is the average distance of a node to all other nodes in the network.
-Betweenness centrality measures the incidence of a node or an edge on the shortest paths between any pair of nodes. For example, in communication networks, an analysis of communication activity requires degree centrality where as a study of communication control requires betweenness centrality and that of communication efficiency requires closeness centrality [18] .
Network models
Theoretic network models studied by mathematicians are mostly random models. But in reality, networks behave in a crucially different manner than random networks. Small-world and scale-free networks are two fundamental models capturing specific architectural features of real networks.
Random networks The classical model is the Erdős-Rényi model (E-R model) proposed in [17] . Degree distribution in E-R graphs is binomial which becomes Poisson when n is very large (n → ∞). The probability of occurance of a vertex
Small world networks Small world problem was first investigated by Milgram in his pioneer work [25] . He observed that an acquaintance chain between any two person is always embedded in a small-world structure (maximum six people). Most complex networks exhibit smaller diameter. The diameter dia increases logarithmically with the size of the network. i.e. dia ≈ logn as n → ∞ [16] . The most acclaimed model in this regard is the W-S model proposed by Watts and Strogatz in [36] .
Scale free networks This model characterizes the dynamicity of an evolving network. Barabási and Albert [2] proposed B-A model with scale-free property. This property states that degree distribution is characterized by power-law:
Evolution of such a model is governed by the law of preferential attachment. By this law the newly added nodes prefer to connect with nodes of higher degree (hubs). Thus the degree of hub nodes continuously increase with the addition of new nodes.
Center-based attack: Strategy
We propose center-based attacks on complex networks in which targeted entities are the different centers as defined in Section 3. Given a network N , first step of the strategy is to identify the central node set (BC/ C/ DC/ M ) in N . Attack is performed by removing all nodes in the identified set and the edges incident on them from N . The damage caused to N in each attempt of node removal is calculated in terms of size of the largest connected component LCC 
Vulnerability analysis of synthetic networks
Now we analyse the vulnerability of different network models towards centerbased attacks. Many algorithms exist for generating network models (Refer [3, 5, 15, 29, 35] for details). We used Pajek software [10] [11] [12] for generating different network models. Random networks were generated using E-R model with Poisson distribution, small world networks using W-S model and scale-free networks using B-A model. The size of networks considered were 500 with average vertex degree of 6. When the networks generated were disconnected; we extracted the giant component alone from the network for our experiments. Therefore the Damage measurement Damage caused by BC, DC and M attacks are all the most comparable. Small world and random models were found to be equally robust in these attacks while scale-free networks were easily destructed. Also, in these attacks, networks were completely destructed at very smaller values of f (< 0.45) (See figures 4, 5, 2). But the response of networks towards C attack was very much different. In this case also scale-free networks were more vulnerable. Small world networks were completely destructed at comparatively larger f (≈ 0.6). However the tolerance of random models was found to be better (f ≈ 0. Change in LCC' For a given value of f , LCC is very small in scale-free networks compared to small world and random networks (See figures 6, 7, 8) . This shows that the scale-free networks are less robust than other two models.
Network destruction M and BC attacks follows almost same rate of network destruction. But in M attack there is a quick and drastic destruction (reduction in LCC ) after a threshold value where as the BC attack follows a gradual destruction mode (See figures 6, 7, 8).
Summary: The general observation was that M and BC attacks are highly hazardous. In synthetic networks the efficiency of attacks was found to be ordered as: M ≥ BC ≥ DC ≥ C. Among the three network models considered here, the scale-free networks were found to be highly vulnerable towards center-based attacks. This is because there exist a larger number of important vertices in scale-free networks as observed by Albert et.al. in [1] . They observed that scalefree networks are more sensitive towards node-removal attacks than random or small-world models. Our finding also conform to this statement.
6 Vulnerability analysis of real-world networks
Network Science Collaboration Network
NetScience network is a coauthorship network; an undirected network with 1589 nodes and 2742 edges. The data set was downloaded from Newman's page [31] . Nodes in the network represent scientists working on network science. Two nodes are connected if the corresponding scientists have co-authored a publication.
Cytoscape 3.5.0 [34] was used for visualization of the network. Network statistics were obtained using the Network Analyzer [4] of Cytoscape. After generating the network we extracted the giant component from it as we focus on the connected network only. Usually the second largest component in a real complex network is very smaller than the largest (giant) component. This is a characteristic feature of a collaboration network as research will work only if the research community is highly connected [30] . In our experiment we consider the giant component of NetScience network which consisted of 379 nodes and 914 edges. A summary of statistics of the giant component of NetScience network is shown in Appendix: Table 1 . We analysed the change in LCC against f in center-based attacks on the giant component of NetScience network. See figure 9 . The findings are summarised below:
-NetScience network is more sensitive to M and BC attacks.
-The network shows more robustness to DC attack.
-Also, the network is completely destroyed at very lower values of f .
Les Miserables Coappearance Network
This coappearance network dataset was compiled by Knuth [24] to represent the co-occurances of characters in Victor Hugo's famous novel Les Misérables. In this undirected network each node represents a character of the novel and each edge represents the co-occurance of two characters in the same chapter. For a summary of statistics of LesMisérables network see Appendix: Table 2 . The vulnerability of LesMisérables network was analysed by running Algorithm 1 and calculating LCC in each iteration. The plot LCC vs. f is shown in figure 10 . The findings are summarized below:
-LesMisérables network is more sensitive to M and BC attacks.
US Popular Airport Network
This is an undirected network of 500 most popular US airports. The data set was compiled and used by Colizza et. al. in 2007 [14] . The nodes represent airports and edges represent the air traffic between them. Hereafter the network is called as US Airport network. See Appendix: Table 3 for a summary of statistics of US Airport network. After running Algorithm 1 on US Airport network we analysed the change in LCC against f . See figure 11 . The observations from the experiment are as follows:
-US Airport network is more sensitive to M and BC attacks.
-The network shows more robustness to C attack.
Yeast Protein Interaction Network
The biological network considered in this study is the protein interaction network for the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. This data set was used by Jeong et. al. in their paper [23] . The nodes represent proteins and edges represent proteinprotein interaction. The actual network consists of 2114 nodes and 2277 edges. But here we extracted and used only the giant component (of 1458 nodes) for our study. See Appendix: Table 4 for a summary of statistics of the giant component of Yeast Protein Interaction network. See figure 12 for the plot LCC vs. f during center-based attacks on Yeast Protein Interaction network. The findings are as follows:
-Yeast Protein Interaction network is more sensitive to M and BC attacks.
-The network shows more robustness to C attack like US Airport network.
Summary:
The efficiency of attacks in real world networks was found to be as: M ≥ BC ≥ DC or C. Collaboration network and literature network shows more robustness towards DC attack while air-transport network and biological network are highly tolerant towards C attack. Among the different real-world networks considered here the robustness of collaboration network was found to be highly weak.
A APPENDIX Average number of co-appearing characters (Average degree) 6 .597 Average chance of co-appearance between co-appearing characters (Clustering coefficient) 57.313% 
